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Crawford v. Washington: Bright Line
Rules to Identify Testimonial Statements
by JENNY M. KIM*

I. Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives a
defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to "be confronted with
the witnesses against him."1 The Constitution's text alone does not
resolve the meaning of the Confrontation Clause and its application
to the admissibility of an unavailable witness' statements. Thus, in
determining whether admission of an unavailable witness' taperecorded statement to a police officer was a Confrontation Clause
violation, the Crawford Court looked to the history of the
Confrontation Clause from its inception at English common law.'
The Court determined that the Framers of the Constitution were
particularly concerned about the unique potential for prosecutorial
abuse.4
In Crawford, the Court expressed concern that there was little
"meaningful protection" from Confrontation Clause violations under
the "indicia of reliability" test articulated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56 (1980).' The Court's two main concerns were that the open-ended
Roberts test was unpredictable and that it admitted "core testimonial
statements"
that the
Constitution intended
to exclude.6

* J.D. Candidate 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2004,
Political Science, University of California, Irvine. I would like to thank Jessica L.
Williams, Erin Morris, Geoff Pittman, and the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Editorial Board for helping to bring this project to fruition.
1.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
Id. at 43-47.
Id. at 56 n.7.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
[425]

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 33.4

Consequently, the Court abrogated Roberts and ruled that, "[w]here
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation."7 While the Court laid down a
clear rule barring the admission of testimonial statements where a
witness is unavailable for cross-examination, the Court did not fully
define what makes a statement "testimonial." 8
In the aftermath of the Crawford decision, lower courts were left
with the task of developing a standard to determine whether a
statement is testimonial and whether its admission would violate the
Confrontation Clause. In June of 2006, two years after Crawford was
decided, the Court revisited the Confrontation Clause and Crawford
to address the more specific issue of what type of interrogations
produce testimony.9
This article surveys the recent United States Supreme Court and
lower court decisions analyzing the distinction between testimonial
and nontestimonial statements and advocates adopting bright line
rules consistent with the Framers' intent. Adopting bright line rules
that comport with the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment would
avoid the vices of the prior standard articulated in Roberts.
These bright line rules consider the formal quality of a statement
and the level of government involvement in procuring that statement.
If there is neither a formal quality to a statement nor a government
agent involved in procuring a statement, courts should rule that it is
nontestimonial. However, where a non-government agent's sole
purpose is to collect evidence as dictated by a statute or at the request
of a prosecutor or police officer, a formal statement collected under
those circumstances should be held testimonial. In that situation, the
non-government agent has, in effect, prosecutorial functions, and
presents a potential for prosecutorial abuse. Finally, courts should
find that spontaneous statements are nontestimonial because they are
not made with an eye toward trial or an opportunity for reflection.
A. Overcoming Confrontation Clause Objections Prior to Crawford
Under Ohio v. Roberts, the Confrontation Clause did not bar
admission of an unavailable witness' statement against a criminal
defendant if the statement bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability. ""' °
7. Id. at 68-69.
8. Id. at 61.
9. Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
10. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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The Roberts reliability test was met when the evidence either fell
within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bore "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.""'
The Court pointed out two vices of the Roberts reliability test. 2
The first vice is that determining a statement's reliability is almost
entirely subjective and leads to unpredictable results. 3
The
procedural history of Crawford illustrates the "unpredictable and
inconsistent application" of the reliability test.'4 There, the trial court,
appellate court and state supreme court each listed their own reasons
for their findings that the statement was or was not reliable. That
procedural history demonstrated that the Roberts test itself was
unreliable in determining whether an unavailable witness' statement
should be admitted.
The second and "unpardonable vice" of the Roberts test is its
history of admitting "core testimonial statements that the
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude."' 6 In Crawford, the
State sought admission of an unavailable witness' tape-recorded
statement to police against a criminal defendant. 7 Justice Scalia
characterized this as ex parte testimony and opined that the trial
court's admission of that statement was a violation of the
Confrontation Clause. 8
Cross-examination was necessary to
undermine the court's assumptions regarding the statement's
reliability. 9 The Court stated that cross-examination would have
teased out the motives of the government officer conducting the
interview, the declarant's perception of whether the officer was
neutral to her,2' and the truth of ambiguous statements.21
B. Crawford and Its Impact
To preserve the protections of the Confrontation Clause,
Crawford abrogated Roberts and placed an absolute bar on the

11.

Id.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-65.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 66.

20.

Id.

21.

Id. at 67.
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admission of testimonial hearsay where an unavailable witness' outof-court statement is concerned.
Because the Constitution's text
Clause's meaning,3
Confrontation
the
resolve
not
does
alone
Crawford provided an extensive historical analysis of the Clause. 24
The Court found that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was
...use of ex parte examinations as evidence
25
against the accused.,
The Court examined the origins of the Confrontation Clause and
determined that the Framers were concerned with the potential for
prosecutorial abuse of ex parte testimony. 6 In 16th century England,
it was routine for Justices of the Peace or other officials to subject
witnesses and suspects to a pretrial examination and use the
statements as evidence in some cases. English common law required
a prior opportunity for cross-examination to admit an unavailable
witness' statement.' This right of confrontation was included in the
Sixth Amendment.2 9 The Court determined that "the Framers would
not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and
the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."3
After Crawford, the threshold question in the Confrontation
Clause analysis is whether a statement is "testimonial." Crawford
explicitly declined to give a comprehensive definition of
"testimonial., 3' However, the Court did make reference to the
dictionary definition of "testimony" and determined it was typically
"[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact. 3 2 The Supreme Court contrasted
the way in which "[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who
makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not., 33 The Crawford
22. Id.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 42-47.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 43-50.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 46-47.
Id.at 49.
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 68.

32. Id. at 51 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AM. DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828)) (alteration in original).

33. Id.
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Court provided various formulations of this core class of testimonial
statements:
[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarant would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially...
; extrajudicial
statements... contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions...
; statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial.34
The Crawford Court did not adopt these formulations and
declared they were not inclusive but "share a common nucleus and
define
the Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around
35
it.

II. Defining "Testimonial"
Typically courts make factual inquiries to determine whether a
statement was made under circumstances that fall under one of three
formulations proposed in Crawford. It is clear that the Court did not
want an open-ended balancing test due to its vulnerability to the type
of manipulation that occurred under the Roberts test.36 However, the
first and third formulations provided in Crawford are open-ended
tests that will require factual inquiries and balancing. Reliance on
these two formulations is vulnerable to similar forms of manipulation
that resulted in application of Roberts.
In light of this consideration, bright line rules that comport with
the history of the Confrontation Clause should be adopted. Crawford
and subsequent case law appear to focus on the formal quality or
solemnity of a statement and the level of government involvement in
procuring the statement to determine whether a statement is
testimonial. This article demonstrates that bright line rules covering a
variety of situations can be developed. These rules remain faithful to
the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Also, bright line rules will
prevent subjective manipulation of the facts by judges and will lead to
predictable results. Lastly, a variety of situations are presented where
a defendant will be afforded the protections of the Confrontation
34. Id. at 51-52.
35. Id. at 52.
36. Id. at 67-68.
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Clause even if prosecutors and police officers modify or outsource
their investigatory functions in response to Crawford.
A. An Examination of Each Formulation
Rather than adopting one formulation, the Court expressed that
"these formulations all share a common nucleus and define the
Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. ' 37 The
Court also added that "some statements qualify under any definition"
which implicitly means that some statements might qualify under only
one definition. 38 Thus, courts should not adopt a single formulation as
the standard to determine whether a statement is testimonial. Doing
so would result in a failure to bar testimonial statements that might be
covered under the other two formulations. Additionally, falling
within one of the three formulations should be a necessary, but not
sufficient, requirement to characterizing a statement as testimonial
due to the vulnerability to similar problems that resulted from
applying the Roberts' "indicia of reliability" test.
The third formulation, "statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial"
is the broadest definition of "testimonial."39 Application of this
formulation to find a testimonial statement is susceptible to the type
of manipulation that occurred with Roberts' "indicia of reliability"
test. Roberts required judges to make factual inquiries and list the
factors that made a statement sufficiently or insufficiently
trustworthy.'
Under the third formulation for a testimonial
statement, a judge will have to produce a similar factual inquiry and
list of factors to determine whether circumstances "would lead an
objective witness" to reasonably believe a statement would further
prosecution. 4' According to Crawford, a judge should not make
assumptions that cross-examination might undermine.42 Whether an
objective witness reasonably believed a statement would be used later
in trial is a question that can only be answered through crossexamination.4 3
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

52.

65.
52.
66.
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Another difficulty with the third formulation is determining who
the "objective witness" is. The court in People v. Sisavath considered
this question." In determining who the objective witness was, where
a four year old child's statement was concerned, the court considered
two options. One option was that the objective witness was "in the
same category of persons as the actual witness., 45 Under that
interpretation, the objective witness would be a four year old child.46
The court rejected this notion and determined it was "more likely
that the Supreme Court meant... if the statement was given under
circumstances in which its use in a prosecution is reasonably
foreseeable by an objective observer, then the statement is
testimonial., 47 The court is probably right since a judge may have a
difficult time ascertaining whether a child would know that a
statement will be used for a later trial.48
The first formulation of a testimonial statement as "ex parte incourt testimony or its functional equivalent - that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially ' '49 is
subject to similar unpredictability as the third formulation.
In
addition, the Crawford decision indicates that one of the purposes of
cross-examination is to determine the subjective intent of a
declarant." It would go against Crawford's reasoning to displace
cross-examination with a judicial determination of what a declarant
reasonably believed.
The second formulation that Crawford offered, "extrajudicial
statements... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,"'" is the
narrowest definition. This definition appears to focus entirely on the
formal quality of a statement without considering the intent or
perception of the declarant or interviewer. Crawford will be read in a
"dynamic system that can and will respond to the opinion with short-

44. 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1402 n.3 (Ct. App. 2004).
45.

Id.

46.
47.

Id.
Id.

48. Miguel A. M6ndez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569,
608 (2004).
49. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
50. Id. at 66.
51. Id. at 51-52.
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term tactical countermeasures and with potentially long-term legal
and institutional changes."52 Relying on the second formulation could
easily be circumscribed with "alternative investigative methods ... to
For example, the second formulation
avoid Crawford's impact. '"'
requires that the statement be contained in formalized testimonial
materials.54 To avoid any violations, prosecutors and police officers
might change their practices and simply eliminate memorializing
statements. The second formulation by itself is not a substantial
obstacle to overcoming Confrontation Clause violations.
B. Bright Line Rules
Crawford stated that a "formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark
to an acquaintance does not."55 This illustration sheds little light on
the issue of what makes a statement testimonial because it compares
two polar opposites. Lower courts are left to struggle with statements
that fall within the polar examples: casual remarks to a government
officer and formal statements to an acquaintance. However, the
Court recently revisited Crawford and made it clear that a formal
quality is essential to finding a testimonial statement.56
This article attempts to create bright line rules for whether a
statement is testimonial based on situations with varying levels of
formality and government involvement. Also, this article argues that
regardless of the level of formality or government involvement in
procuring a statement, courts should hold that spontaneous
statements, by definition, are nontestimonial.
1. A Formal Quality Is a Necessary Requirement in Finding a
Testimonial Statement.
Where it is clear that a statement was knowingly made to a police
officer or government official, courts will focus on the formality of the
statement. According to Crawford, "[a]n accuser who makes a formal
However,
statement to government officers bears testimony.""
where there is no formal quality in either the statement or the
52. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontationof Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 513 (2005).
53. Id.
54. Crawford,541 U.S. at 51-52.
55. Id. at 51.
56. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.
57. Crawford,541 U.S. at 51.
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proceeding, courts should find that a statement is not testimonial. An
informal statement to a government officer does not resemble a 16th
century English pretrial examination.
The need for a formal quality in the statement or proceeding is
essential in determining whether statements made to agents of law
enforcement are made in the course of an "interrogation" and are,
therefore, testimonial.
Crawford extrapolated from its various
formulations that testimonial "applies at a minimum to... police
interrogations. 58
,
While Crawford specifically stated that police
interrogations are testimonial, it did not fully define "interrogation"
as distinguished from other types of questioning. Instead, Crawford
used the term in its "colloquial, rather than any technical, legal
sense" 59 and implicated that testimony involves a solemn declaration
or a formal statement to a government officer. 6° A police
interrogation requires a formal quality with a view toward
prosecution.

61

Some types of formality that courts note are the

presence of structured questioning,62 whether an arrest has already
occurred, 63 whether the government initiates contact, 64 or
memorialization of the proceeding through a video tape65 or tape
recording.6

Though formality is "essential to testimonial utterance, 67 the
level of formality required is minimal so long as the statement is "[a]
solemn declaration . . . made for the purpose of establishing or

proving some fact."'

This clarification on the definition of

"testimonial" statements came in June of 2006 when the Court
revisited the Confrontation Clause and Crawford issues in the context

of "statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call
or at a crime scene." 69 Davis was decided together with Hammon v.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 53 n.4.
Id. at 51.
People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th 461,468 (Ct. App. 2004).
See id. at 469.
See id. at 468.
See id.
See People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1400 (Ct. App. 2004).
See Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 468.
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2278 n.5 (2006).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting NOAH WEBSTER,

DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828)) (alteration in original).

69. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2270.

AM.
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Indiana.' The Court proceeded by separately comparing the facts in
Davis and Hammon to those in Crawford.71
Davis involved statements made by Michelle McCottry to a 911
emergency operator regarding a domestic disturbance with the
The Court
defendant Adrian Davis, her former boyfriend.72
determined that the initial statements made during this call were not
testimonial.73 There were four factors distinguishing Davis from
74 The Court looked at the timing of the statements in
Crawford.
relation to the criminal event, the presence of a threat of imminent
danger, the purpose of the statements, and the level of formality in
procuring the statement.75
First, unlike the declarant in Crawford, McCottry was "speaking
about events as they were actually happening,rather than 'describ[ing]
past events. ' ' 76 Second, an objective observer would recognize that
McCottry was facing an ongoing emergency rather than calling 911 to77
give a "narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger.,
Third, an objective observer would find that the purpose of the
questions and statements was "to resolve the present emergency,
rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in
the past., 78 On this point, the Court noted that an interrogation to
determine the need for emergency assistance may .'evolve into79
testimonial statements' once that purpose has been achieved.,
Lastly, the level of formality in McCottry's frantic answers over the
phone in an environment that was not tranquil or safe is in stark
contrast with Sylvia Crawford's calm responses "at the station house,
to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and
making notes of her answers. ' 8°
In Hammon, statements were elicited when police officers

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind.Ct. App. 2004).
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-79.
Id. at 2270-72.
Id. at 2277.
Id. at 2276-77.

75.

Id.

76. Id. at 2276 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion))
(alteration in original).
77.

Id.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 2277 (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.2005), rev'd sub nom.
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006)) (citation omitted).
80. Id.
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responded to the scene of a reported domestic disturbance.81 Officers
found Amy Hammon on the front porch outside of her house and
defendant, Hershel Hammon, in the kitchen.82 Amy gave statements
about what had happened and signed an affidavit.83 Unlike the
statements made in Davis, those in Hammon were similar to
testimonial statements found in Crawford.' First, the statements
were elicited to describe what happened in the past rather than what
was actually happening.85 Second, there was no emergency in
progress as the interrogating officer "testified that he had heard no
arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break anything."86
Third, an objective observer would find that the primary purpose of
the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime rather than to
resolve a present emergency.'
Even though the Court found a higher level of formality in
Crawford than Hammon, the circumstances in Hammon were "formal
enough."' The Crawford interrogation "followed a Miranda warning,
was tape-recorded, and took place at the station house." 89 However,

these features were not essential to the testimonial aspect of the
statements made. 9° It was sufficient that the interrogation in
Hammon was conducted in a separate room from the defendant, for
the purpose of describing past criminal events, and took place after
the criminal events were over. 91 Thus, the Court held that statements

given under official interrogation are "inherently testimonial"
because they are an obvious substitute for live testimony. 92
Davis appears to hold that when a statement describes an event
in the past - rather than events as they are actually happening - an

objective observer would find that when the declarant made the
statement, she was not facing an ongoing emergency. Moreover, an
objective viewer would find that the primary purpose of the statement
81. Id. at 2272.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2278.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2278.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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is to gather evidence in investigating a crime rather than to end a
In these circumstances, the statement is
current emergency.
sufficiently formal to be deemed testimonial.
2.

Government Involvement Should Be a Necessary Requirement in
Finding a Testimonial Statement.

Crawford noted that "[i]nvolvement of government officers in
the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique
potential for prosecutorial abuse." 93 Statements have been found to

be nontestimonial when "made to family, friends, and acquaintances
without an intention for use at trial."'94 While cases appear to
necessitate some type of government involvement, the scope of
involvement appears broad. The more difficult cases are those in
which a statement is not made directly to a government official, but
where there is some level of government involvement in procuring
the statement and some formality to the proceedings. Some examples
of government involvement include: the level of involvement with law
officials, 9 special training that the
enforcement procedures and
96
interviewer must complete, whether statutes govern procedure, 97 and

purpose of the interview. 9' It appears that all of these factors go
toward determining whether the interviewer intended to use the
statement in prosecution.
a. Casual Statements to a Family, Friend, or Acquaintance Should
Be Held Nontestimonial.
A casual statement to a person unaffiliated with a government
agency has been held nontestimonial because a declarant would not
reasonably believe the statement would be available for use at a later
trial.9 According to Crawford, a casual remark to an acquaintance is
not testimonial.'00 A statement that is not contained in formalized
materials, made under formal procedures, nor procured through
government involvement is not at risk for prosecutorial abuse. A
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
Mosteller, supra note 52, at 540.
See People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1403 (Ct. App. 2004).
See id. at 1400.
See City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 595 (Nev. 2004).
See Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th at 1402-03.
See People v. Cervantes, 118 Cal. App. 4th 162, 174 (Ct. App. 2004).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
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declarant making such a statement would more likely expect that the
statement will be kept in confidence rather than be turned over to
police. 1
In Cervantes, Ubaldo Cervantes, Jose Martinez, and Cesar R.
Morales were convicted of first degree murder. °" The trial court
admitted Morales's out-of-court statement made to his neighbor
detailing the criminal acts committed earlier that morning.0 3 On
appeal, the nondeclarant defendants contended that Morales's
statement to his neighbor should have been excluded from evidence
as against each nondeclarant defendant. 1"4
The trial court found the neighbor's trial testimony regarding
Morales's out-of-court statements was "admissible as against
Morales's penal interest and found 'sufficient indicia of
trustworthiness and reliability to overcome the [Confrontation
Clause] objections. '"' 0' In support of its ruling, the court noted that
Morales sought his neighbor out for medical assistance "outside the
normal avenues [for treatment], in all likelihood due to the manner in
'
Morales's neighbor was not
which the injuries were suffered. '"la
connected with or operating as an agent for any law enforcement
agency and her curiosity was understandable since she was
Although Morales's
acquainted with all three defendants."
statement appeared to minimize his participation or shift blame on to
the other codefendants, the trial court held that his statement: "[w]e
shot at the guy," was an acknowledgement of his equal level of
culpability.' °8 Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial
the neighbor's testimony as against Morales's penal
court admitted
interest.1°9
The appellate court applied the new Crawford test and ruled that
the statement was nontestimonial." ° The statement was "not similar
to the primary examples of testimonial statements given in Crawford"
and was possibly testimonial only under Crawford's third formulation

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See Cervantes, 118 Cal. App. 4th at 174.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 170 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
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of testimonial: statements "made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial."''.
In applying this
formulation of testimonial statements to the facts of the case, the
court found that a statement made to a friend who provided medical
assistance was nontestimonial because it was more reasonable to
believe that declarant expected his statement would not be used for
future prosecution."'
Determining whether an objective witness would reasonably
believe that the statements would be used in prosecution required the
court to examine the circumstances under which the statements were
made. Codefendants Cervantes and Martinez argued they "made the
statement to [the neighbor] knowing she would repeat it to the police,
as she eventually did.', 1 3 The court rejected this contention as an
unreasonable view of the evidence."' Instead, the court ruled that it
was more reasonable that the defendant expected his neighbor not to
repeat his statements to the police considering that he "sought
medical assistance from a friend of long standing who had come to
visit his home."" 5 Additionally, the neighbor admitted that she knew
of the defendant's status as a gang member and was afraid to testify in
the case" 6 The facts of Cervantes provide an easier situation since
there was no level of government involvement or formality in
procuring the statement to evidence any intent to use the statement at
trial on either the declarant or neighbor's part.
Other jurisdictions have also ruled that informal statements
where non-government agents are not involved are not testimonial."7
In Rivera, a defendant's confession to his cousin was made under
circumstances which would not lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial. 8 Specifically, the declarant "made the statement in confidence
and on his own initiative to a close family member."". 9 The court held

111. Id. at 173 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
112. Id. at 17.4.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 202 (Conn. 2004).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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20

that this statement was nontestimonial.1
Informal statements to non-government agents who are not
working with the government to collect evidence should be held
nontestimonial. Such a statement does not fall within any of the
formulations that Crawford proposed. Crawford specifically stated
that a casual remark to an acquaintance is not testimonial. 12 ' These
statements are generally made with the expectation that they will be
held in confidence and do not present a potential for prosecutorial
abuse.
b. Informal Statement Made Unknowingly to a Government Official
The Crawford Court decided that a police interrogation occurred
because the statement was knowingly given in response to police
Lower courts are presented with cases where there is
questioning.
neither structured questioning, nor is a statement made "knowingly"
to a police officer or government agent. It has been held that where a
statement is made unknowingly to a government official, that
statement is nontestimonial because a declarant would23 not reasonably
believe the statement would be used for prosecution.'
Crawford cited Bourjaily as a case in which the outcome was
"'consistent with' the principle that the [Confrontation] Clause
permits the admission of nontestimonial statements in the absence of
a prior opportunity for cross-examination,', 124 even though the
reasoning may have been incorrect.'25 In Bourjaily, a tape-recorded
statement was made unknowingly to a Federal Bureau of
The statement was admitted over
Investigation agent."6
Confrontation Clause objections because it fell under the firmly
... made in
rooted hearsay exception for "co-conspirators' statements
1 27
conspiracy.
the
of
furtherance
in
and
course
the
In a case containing facts similar to Bourjaily, the court was
guided by Crawford's approval of admitting a formal statement made
without a declarant's knowledge that a government agent was

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
Id. at 53 n.4.
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 229 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57-58).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58.
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 173 (1987).
Id. at 183.
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receiving that statement."' In Saget, statements were made to a
confidential informant who the declarant considered a friend.129 The
court deciphered from the various formulations stated in Crawford
that "the statement must be such that the declarant reasonably
expects that the statement might be used in future judicial
proceedings."1' 30 Saget held that a "declarant's statements to a
confidential informant, whose true status is unknown to the declarant,
do not constitute testimony within the meaning of Crawford.' 13' This
scenario suggests that the declarant's perception of the situation
carries weight in determining whether a statement is testimonial.
This is likely due to the effect that the declarant's perception of the
situation will have on the truthfulness of the statement. The
recipient's intent to use the statement as evidence for prosecution is
not, in itself, sufficient to label a statement testimonial.
Where there is no formality to procuring a statement and the
declarant does not have knowledge that the recipient is a government
agent, courts should find such a statement is nontestimonial. Such a
statement does not fall even under the broadest formulation of
testimonial. An objective witness would not reasonably believe a
statement made under those circumstances would be used at a later
trial.
c. Informal Statement Knowingly Made to a Government Official
Where it is clear that a statement was knowingly made to a police
officer or government official, courts will focus on the formality of the
statement. According to Crawford, "[a]n accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony .... ,,132 However,
where there is no formal quality in either the statement or the
proceeding, courts should find that a statement is not testimonial. An
informal statement to a government officer does not resemble a 16th
century English pretrial examination. Nor does it resemble a police
interrogation, even in its colloquial sense.
A statement given to a police officer responding to a 911 call was
found to be nontestimonial because it "b[ore] no indicia common to
the official and formal quality of the various statements deemed

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Saget, 377 F.3d at 229.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
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133
'
testimonial by Crawford."
In Corella, a police officer dispatched to
the crime scene found the victim "crying and distraught;" she
also"appeared to be in physical pain. ' m The victim said appellant
punched her in several places on her body and she recounted the
reasons for the assault.'
In deciding whether this statement was
testimonial, the court focused on the formality of the proceedings.'3 6
The court held that informal and unstructured preliminary questions
asked by a police officer responding to a 911 call did not amount to "a
police interrogation merely because Officer Diaz was an officer and
obtained information from" the victim.1'7 The court also found it
probative that contact was initiated not by the police, but by the
victim.
These factors contributed to the court's finding that there
was no formality39 to the proceedings and the statement was therefore
nontestimonial.1
Decisions by lower courts classifying informal statements to a
government officer as nontestimonial comport with the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause to prevent prosecutorial abuse. Where
there is no formality to the statement or proceeding, the potential
that a declarant or witness was forced to make inculpating statements
is less likely.
Police questioning alone, without a formalized
statement or formal proceeding, does not resemble a police
interrogation.

d. Formal Statement to a Non-government Official Working with a
Government Agency or Procedures Governed by Statute
The Framers and the Crawford Court were especially concerned
with the potential for prosecutorial abuse.' ° Under Crawford, a
police interrogation is testimonial and this classification has been
broadened to include interrogation by other government agents such
as prosecutors. For example, in United States v. Saner, the court
found the only distinguishing factor between the statement to a
prosecutor and Crawford's statement to a police officer was that the
declarant was not in custody when he made statements to the

133. People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th 461, 468 (Ct. App. 2004).
134.

Id. at 465.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 468.
Id.
541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
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prosecutor.14' The Saner court found that the role of a modern day
prosecutor probably provides a closer analogy to the role of 18th
Century English Justices of the Peace than modern day investigating
officers because the risk of prosecutorial abuse is presented.142 Thus,
statements made in response to interrogation by prosecutors
can be
1 43
testimonial if there is a formal quality to the statement.
However, it should not be necessary that a government agent
actually procure a statement in order to deem it testimonial. If that
were the case, then government agencies would avoid Confrontation
Clause issues by outsourcing their evidence gathering needs to
independent agencies. Instead, courts should look at whether: a
government agent prompted a statement to be taken; a statute
governs the procedure for use at a later trial; criminal charges have
been filed; the interviewer was trained by a government agent; or
government agents are present at, but not conducting the interview.
In California, a child's statement to an interviewer employed by
a non-government agency has been held testimonial because there
was a high level of government involvement in setting up the
interview.'" In addition to the presence of a deputy district attorney
and investigator from the district attorney's office, the interview took
place after a preliminary hearing had already been held and the
information already filed.'45 Taking these facts into consideration the
court found "no serious question but that Victim 2's statement was
'made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial.""'
In People v. Warner, the high degree of law
enforcement involved in training interviewers, observing the
interview, and using the interview once a criminal investigation was
determined to be warranted would lead an objective witness to
reasonably
expect the interview would be used prosecutorially and at
47
trial.
Even where a law enforcement agent or proceeding is not
involved in procuring the statement, an interview conducted for the
sole purpose of developing testimony under a relevant statute may
141.

313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (S.D. Ind. 2004).

142. Id.
143. Id. at 902.
144. People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1402 (Ct. App. 2004).
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).
147. 119 Cal. App. 4th 331,344 (Ct. App. 2004).
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qualify as testimonial.
In Snowden v. State, a social worker's
interviews with children "for the expressed purpose of developing
their testimony ... under the relevant Maryland statute" were ruled

testimonial under Crawford. 8 Also, in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh,
the affidavit of a registered health professional made pursuant to
Nevada Code was testimonial because it was prepared solely for the
prosecution's use at trial.149
The reasoning and outcomes of lower court cases suggest that a
non-government agent, who is working with a prosecutor or under a
statute to collect evidence, is acting in a prosecutorial function. In
this scenario, the declarant is in effect making a statement to a
government agent. The formal quality of the statement and level of
government involvement would lead an objective witness to
reasonably believe that the statement would be used as evidence in a
later trial.
e. Formal Statement to a Non-government Agent with No
Government Involvement
While an accuser who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance
does not bear testimony, courts struggle with how a formalized
statement to a non-government agent should be categorized. This
situation might be covered under the second formulation offered by
Crawford - as an extrajudicial statement contained in a formalized
material - but should nevertheless be held nontestimonial to avoid
injustice and comport with the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause."' A declarant who makes a statement that is memorialized
might consider that the statement could be used later at trial.
However, just because a statement could, and should, be used at trial
does not mean that a declarant would reasonably believe the
statement would be used for prosecution. A formal statement to a
non-government agent, whose purpose is not to collect evidence, does
not present a potential for prosecutorial abuse.
3.

Spontaneous Statements
Spontaneous statements are nontestimonial in nature. T Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, an unavailable declarant's statement
148.
149.

846 A.2d 36,47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
91 P.3d 591, 595 (Nev. 2004).

150. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).
151. Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 829 N.E.2d 444
(Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
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may be admitted as an excited utterance if the statement is made
while declarant is under the stress of an exciting event and the
statement relates to the startling event. After Crawford this hearsay
exception is inapplicable if the statement is testimonial. However,
there is case law deciding that a spontaneous statement, by definition,
is nontestimonial because there is no opportunity for reflection when
the statement is made and the statement is not made with an eye
toward trial.
In People v. Moscat, the court decided the admissibility of a
statement made in a 911 call. 52 It considered the argument that the
911 call was testimonial because a police interrogation occurs when
the "caller answers questions posed by the police operator."'' 3 Prior
to Crawford, the statement was admissible as a spontaneous
statement, which is a firmly rooted hearsay exception.'54 The court
held that a "911 call for help is essentially different in nature than the
'testimonial' materials that Crawford tells us the Confrontation
Clause was designed to exclude."'55
The court looked at the reasoning behind classifying police
interrogations as testimonial statements. 56 The historical analysis in
Crawford reveals that the "[sixteenth] and [seventeenth] century
English practice of pretrial examinations conducted by Justices of the
Peace [was] a practice against which the Confrontation Clause was
intentionally directed." 157
Formal police interrogations are
testimonial because they are analogous to the English practice of
pretrial examinations. 5 '
A pretrial examination is testimonial
because it is "undertaken by the government in contemplation
of
'' 59
pursuing criminal charges against a particular person. 1
A 911 call is fundamentally different from a pretrial
examination."6 One feature distinguishing a 911 call from a pretrial
examination is that a victim typically initiates a 911 call. 6' When a
victim initiates a 911 call, he or she is usually seeking to be rescued,

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 875 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 877.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id.
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not to generate evidence against a suspect. 62 Another distinction
between 911 calls and pretrial examinations is that most 911 calls are
"made in the immediate aftermath of the crime" and can qualify as a
spontaneous statement. 6 1 When a 911 call qualifies as an excited
utterance, the reasoning that the statement is produced without an
eye toward trial is bolstered further. In such a situation, "there has
been no opportunity for the caller to reflect and falsify her (or his)
account of events."'' 64 A 911 call made under the excitement of a
startling event is more similar to an "electronically augmented
equivalent of a loud cry for help" than a "formal pretrial examination
by a Justice of the Peace in reformation England.' ' 165 Thus, the victim
is not "conscious that he [or she] is bearing witness . . . ." In other
words, the declarant is not contemplating the impact of the statement
on furthering prosecution in contrast to one who "gives a formal
statement, or deposition, or affidavit . .. ."' The court concluded
that a 911 call is nontestimonial in nature. 67
A California court has followed Moscat's reasoning in
determining that a 911 call is not testimonial."6 The court added that
it would be "difficult to identify any circumstances under which a...
spontaneous statement would be 'testimonial. ' 169 A spontaneous
statement hearsay exception applies to a statement when the
utterance is "made without reflection or deliberation due to the stress
of excitement.' 170 Although a 911 call may ultimately be used in a
future trial, "statements made without reflection or deliberation are
not made
in contemplation of their 'testimonial' use in a future
,171
trial."
III. Conclusion
In the aftermath of Crawford, judges, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers struggle to define what makes a statement testimonial in
order to avoid Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violations.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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170.
171.
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Previously, under the Roberts test, the Confrontation Clause was not
a difficult obstacle to overcome. However, Crawford determined that
Roberts produced unpredictable results and admitted statements that
the Confrontation Clause meant to keep out. As a result, the Court
overruled Roberts with regard to testimonial statements and placed
an absolute bar to the admission of an unavailable witness'
testimonial statement where there was not a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. Crawford failed to fully define what makes a
statement testimonial.
By conducting a survey of lower court cases, this article rejects
any open-ended tests and points out several bright line rules for
determining whether a statement is testimonial based on the formal
quality of the statement and level of government involvement in
procuring the statement. This article suggests that where there is
neither a formal quality to the statement nor government
involvement in procuring the statement, a court should hold that a
statement is not testimonial because such a statement bears little
resemblance to a pretrial examination. Also, a non-government
agent whose purpose, either by statute or at the request of a
government agent, is to secure evidence, should be treated as a
government agent and the statement should be held testimonial only
if the statement has a formal quality. Finally, any statements that fall
within the spontaneous statement hearsay exception are by nature
nontestimonial because there is opportunity for reflection when the
statement is made.
Spontaneous statements are not made or
procured with an eye toward trial and are therefore nontestimonial.
These bright line rules comport with the history and purpose of
the Confrontation Clause to avoid prosecutorial abuse. While bright
line rules could lead to a change in the way prosecutors and police
officers conduct investigations to avoid Confrontation Clause issues,
this article covers a variety of situations such that any changes that
might be made should fall under one of the scenarios discussed. Any
questions about whether a statement is testimonial should be resolved
by one of the scenarios discussed above. These rules provide clear
guidance to judges and practitioners who attempt to seek justice,
afford defendants a fair trial, and remain faithful to the purposes of
the Confrontation Clause.

